This is not a perfect solution, because email traffic is not end-to-end encrypted. Savvy adversaries monitor public lists of bridge IPs, and so the Tor Project distributes them via email. This may be part of national policy, as with China, Iran, etc. People typically use bridges when their Internet uplink (ISP, university, employer, etc.) blocks access to known entry guards. The full content of the Email must already be intercepted before this code can analyze it. If the "email_body" function finds what it is looking for, it passes the full email text to a C++ program which extracts the bridge addresses and stores them in a database. The fingerprint first checks every message using the "email_address" function to see if the message is to or from Next, if the address matched, it uses the "email_body" function to search the full content of the Email for a particular piece of text - in this case, " ". This code demonstrates the ease with which an XKeyscore rule can analyze the full content of intercepted connections. Second, in order obtain the actual bridge addresses for the purpose of tracking connections to them in the future, the "microplugin" fingerprint called " anonymizer/tor/bridge/email" extracts data from the body of the emails that the Tor Project sends to its users. First, the fingerprint " anonymizer/tor/bridge/tls" records connections to the server. The following fingerprints show two ways that XKeyscore attempts to track Tor bridge users. Users can request a bridge address via Email or on the web. May this procedure be halted until more anonymous ways are found and/or the procedure continues with the strict warning that it is only for purposes of circumvention and anonymity can not be achieved in this fashion?įollowing, please find an excerpt from Das Erste: This procedure hinders anonymity as in new revelations by Das Erste. Bridges can be advertised by Email to clients.
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